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ABSTRACT: 
  The main reason of the bubble economy of the late 1980's in Japan is generally 
thought to be the Bank of Japan's extremely low level of independence. Their 
explanation is that when the U.S. administration and the Ministry of Finance 
demanded that the Bank of Japan loosen monetary policy, the Bank complied, and 
that its loose monetary policy stimulated a rapid increase in the price of land and 
stocks. I argue, however, that the Bank of Japan ultimately decided to loosen 
monetary policy on its own volition, for the Bank worried excessively about a 
possible recession caused by the appreciation of the yen and was concerned about a 
sudden depreciation of the dollar. Moreover, there were no signs of an increase in 
inflationary pressures, though the value of assets continued to rise extraordinarily. 
Therefore, the Bank of Japan had no positive reasons to tighten monetary policy.
1. Introduction
  In this article, I will examine the popular opinion that the dependent central 
bank caused the bubble economy in the late 1980's in Japan. I will argue that the 
Bank of Japan was independent from the prime minister and the Ministry of 
Finance to an extent that was important and that the Bank ultimately decided to 
loosen monetary policy on its own volition. 
  Most of the researchers regard the bubble economy of the late 1980's as a main 
cause of the stagnation of Japanese economy in the 1990's. Hiroshi Yoshikawa 
argues, for example, that the recession in the first half of the 1990's was caused by
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the stock adjustment and the reduction of investment as a reaction to the economic 
bubble; and the recession in the latter half of the 1990's was caused by the 
reduction of investment as a result of tighter bank lending and finance retrenchment 
policyl). Another cause that made the recession serions was the change of the bank 
behavior due to the increase of bad bans. Throughout he 1990's, according to the 
empirical analyses of economists, the drop of the property price caused by the 
collapse of the bubble economy deteriorated the balance sheets of enterprises and 
reduced the security price of their properties, which resulted in the credit crunch 
and decreased investment. They also argued that in the autumn of 1997 when 
concerns about the financial system deepened, the bad loan problem of banks that 
had continued for a long time decreased banks' capital. This intensified tighter bank 
. lending, which meant he decline of the financial mediation function of banksz) 
  Many economists, political scientists, and journalists insist that the Bank of 
Japan's extremely low level of independence was the main reason behind the 
inflation of the bubble economy. Their explanation goes as follows. The U.S. 
administration demanded that the Japanese government expand omestic demand to 
reduce its huge current account surplus with the U.S. However, the Ministry of 
Finance resisted increases in fiscal expenditures, instead prioritizing fiscal 
reconstruction. Thus, the Ministry demanded that the Bank of Japan loosen 
monetary policy. The Bank of Japan complied, unable to reject the Finance 
Ministry's demand due to its lack of independence from the Ministry. In February 
1987, the Bank of Japan lowered the official discount rate to 2.5% and kept it at 
that level until May 1989. This excessively loose monetary policy drastically 
increased financial liquidity, stimulating a rapid increase in the price of land and 
     3) stocks.
1)
2)
3)
Hiroshi Yoshikawa, Tenkan-ki no Nihon Keizai [Turning Point of Japanese Economy] (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1999), pp.7-41. 
Shigenori Shiratsuka, Hiroo Taguchi, and Naruki Mori, "Nihon ni okeru Baburu Hokai go no 
Chosei ni taisuru Seisaku Taio: Chukan Hokoku" [Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble 
Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review], Kin yu Kenkyu 19, no.4 (2000): 87-143. 
See, for example, William Grimes, Unntaking the Japanese Miracle: Macroeconontic Politics, 
1985-2000 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); C. Randall Henning, Currencies and Politics 
in the United States, Germany, and Japan (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994); Nobuhito Kishi, Kenjin Tachi no Gosan [Miscalculations by the Sages] 
(Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1994), pp.41-89; Yoshihiro Kuroki, Km-yu Seisaku no 
Yukosei [Effectiveness of Monetary Policy] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1999), pp. 177-205; 
Akira Sato, Dokyuniento Kin-yu Hatan [Documentary of Financial Meltdown] (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten), pp.326-363; Tsugio Tajiri, Chuo Ginko Kiki no Jidai [Age of Crisis for Central Banks] 
(Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1997), pp.420-427.
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  In general, central bank's independence is judged by reference to the legal 
provisions concerning the relationship between the government and the central 
bank4). According to the former Bank of Japan Law, which was enacted in 1942, 
the Bank of Japan was placed under the supervision of the Finance Minister who 
had the power to order the Bank to undertake any necessary business. Moreover, 
the governor of the Bank of Japan was appointed by the cabinet and the cabinet had 
an authority to dismiss the governor. Therefore, the Bank of Japan had been 
regarded as a less independent central bank from the government and the Ministry 
of Finance before the Bank of Japan Law was revised to grant legal independence 
from the government in 19985). To be sure, in 1973, inflation was aggravated 
because the Bank of Japan could not tighten monetary policy against Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka who insisted on lowering interest rates6) 
. 
  However, in Japan, price stability has been achieved since 1975 though the 
central bank lacks formai independence7 . Especially in 1980, the Bank of Japan 
tightened monetary policy against the Finance Ministry's wishes, and in doing so, 
succeeded in controlling inflation after the second oil shock8. In fact, Torben 
Iversen argues that the Bank of Japan has been implemented a conservative 
monetary policy since the late 1970's9). I insisted in another thesis that the Bank of 
Japan gained the substantial independence since 1975 and was able to decide 
monetary policy by itself to some extent against the pressures from the prime
4)
5)
6)
7) 
8)
9)
Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers, "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25 (1993): 
151-62; Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb, and Bilin Neyapti, "Measuring the Independence of 
Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review 6 (1992): 
353-98; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, "Political and Monetary 
Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries," Economic Policy 13 (1991): 
366-75. 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti, "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on 
Policy Outcomes"; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, "Political and Monetary Institutions and 
Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries"; Masaru Mabuchi, Okurasho Tosei no Seiji 
Keizaigaku [The Political Economy of the Treasury's Control] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1994); 
Tajiri, Chuo Ginko Kiki no Jidai. 
Thomas F. Cargill, Michael M. Hutchison, and Takatoshi Ito, The Political Economy of Japanese 
Monetary Policy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp.35, 191; Henning, Currencies and 
Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan, pp.77-78. 
Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, The Political Economy ofJapanese Monetary Policy, pp.5-6. 
Ryunoshin Kamikawa, "Sengo Kin-yu Seisaku no Kettei" [The Politics of Monetary Policy in 
Postwar Japan], Hogaku Ronso 149, no.3 (2001): 97-117, 150, no.3 (2001): 103-27. 
Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of' Macr oeconomics and Wage 
Bargaining in Advanced Dernocracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.57-60.
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minister and the Ministry of Finance 
  Then, in this article, I will examine the popular opinion that the dependent. 
central bank caused the bubble economy in the late 1980's in Japan. I will argue 
that the Bank of Japan was independent from the prime minister and the Ministry of 
Finance to an extent that was important and that the Bank ultimately decided to 
loosen monetary policy on its own volition. 
  Now I argue how I evaluate the independence of the Bank of Japan. Sylvia 
Maxfield argues that
  Central bank authority is probably best evaluated by using classic 
indicators of power: number of instances in which a central bank achieves 
compliance with its policy preferences from those opposed and, more subtly, 
number of instances in which a central bank manages to keep opposing policy 
options off the policy agenda entirely1 1) 
.
  Following her argument, I will examine the process of the Bank of Japan's 
loosening monetary policy and evaluate the independence of it. 
  If the Ministry of Finance demanded that it loosen monetary policy and it 
loosened monetary policy against its own policy preferences, I judged that it was 
not independent from the Ministry. However, if it agreed with the Ministry's 
demand and loosened monetary policy on its own will, I do not regard it as 
dependent. If it did not loosen monetary policy though the Ministry required to 
loosen monetary policy, I judge that it was independent from the Ministry. 
  This article is organized as follows. In the second section, I will argue that the 
loosened monetary policy did not trigger the asset price inflation but caused 
acceleration of it. That is, the asset price already began to rise in the early 1980's 
because of several factors other than the loosened monetary policy. In consequence, 
it was difficult for the Bank of Japan to judge that monetary policy should be 
tightened in order to control the asset prices. In the third and fourth section, I will 
trace the process through which monetary policy was formulated and demonstrate 
that the Bank of Japan was independent from the prime minister and the Ministry of 
Finance to some extent. In the fifth section, I will show that the Bank of Japan was 
not so dependent in comparison with the other central banks of the industrialized 
nations, especially with the German Bundesbank which was generally regarded as
10) Kamikawa, "Sengo Kin-yu Seisaku no Kettei." 
11) Sylvia Maxfield, "Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations," 
   World Politics 46, no.4 (1994): 556-88.
2006] THE B UBBLE ECONOMY AND THE BANK OF JAPAN 109
the most independent central bank.
2. The Rising of the Asset Prices in the early 1980's.
  In this section, I will explain why the asset prices went up in the early 1980's. 
  Most economists insist that the excessive loosening of monetary policy caused 
the bubble economy. However, the asset price inflation in the late 1980's was not 
caused irectly by loosening of monetary policy. The monetary easing is just one of 
necessary conditions for the bubble economy and it is never a sufficient condition. 
In my view, the bubble economy occurred because monetary policy was loosened 
when there was the upward tendency of stock and land prices already. In fact, in the 
early 1980's, though the economic condition was not so good, the prices of land 
and stocks were rising without loosened monetary policy. Why did the asset price 
go up in the early 1980's?
2.1. Surging Stock Prices
  The stock prices in Japan began rising in 1983 and went up at a furious pace in 
1986 and 1987. On October 20, 1987, stock prices dropped sharply because the 
New York Stock Exchange had collapsed on the preceding day. However, the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange recovered earlier than the stock exchange markets in other 
countries and the stock prices were skyrocketing until the end of 1989. Business 
boom started in 1987 and business had been sluggish before12~. Then, why the stock 
prices had risen before 1987? 
  At the end of the FY 1979, the prices of the 6.1 percent government bonds fell 
sharply and the loss of 13 city banks was estimated at about 550 billion yen. The 
Ministry of Finance gave notice that companies might change the accounting 
standard from lowest cost accounting to cost purchase accounting under which the 
value of the government bonds is estimated at the purchase price. By doing so, the 
Ministry of Finance thought that it was able to make banks buy the government 
bonds continuously because banks got off writing down. Then, a lot of banks 
adopted cost purchase accounting13). However, owing to it, they had to write down 
by selling the government bonds unless the current prices of the govemment bonds
12) Yasuhiro Yonezawa, Kabushiki Shijo no Keizaigaku [Economics of Stock Market] (Tokyo: Nihon 
   Keizai Shimbunsha, 1995), pp.65-66. 
13) Yasuharu Ishizawa, Za MOF [The Ministry of Finance] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1995), pp.273-
  275.
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were so expensive, because the average purchasing prices of the government bonds 
became expensive by adding up the prices of the 6.1 percent government bonds 
which were bought further and the government bonds which had been purchased 
already. Thus, in order to prompt companies and banks to purchase the government 
bonds, the Ministry of Finance permsted them to adopt he accounting procedure of 
dividing the book prices of securities which they had held already and those of 
securities which were bought by using cash in trust (so-called Boka-Bunri). Since 
companies could save the corporate income tax, most companies adopted this 
accounting procedure and corporate investment funds (specified money trust, so-
called Tokkin) became a big thing. This gave rise to the boom of speculative 
investment on the stock exchange (Zai-Tech Boom)14) 
. 
  In Japan, banks and business corporations had held corporate stocks mutually 
and 70% of the total stocks were held as such cross-share holdings. That is, only 
30% of the total stocks circulated in the stock exchange market. Thereby, aggregate 
market value went up much higher when speculative money flowed into the 
market 15) 
  Moreover, owing to the appreciation of land values, the stock prices of 
companies which had real estate increased. Securities companies reassessed the 
estate in land of business corporations and recommended to their customers that 
they purchase the stocks of the companies which had hidden profits on land16). 
  In 1987, the stocks of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and TelephoneCorporation) 
which had been privatized in 1985 were sold in order to cover the fiscal deficits. 
The Ministry of Finance persisted in selling the stocks of NTT at a high Price. 
Securities companies rigged the stock price of Tokyo Electric Power Company by 
recommending their customers purchasing the stocks. The Ministry of Finance gave 
silent approval to them. Tokyo Electric Power Company was regarded as a similar 
company to NTT because they were both occupied in public service, the 
government approved and licensed their rates, and their scales were similar. Hence, 
it was thought hat the sales price of the NTT stock were determined in reference to 
the price of the Tokyo Electric Power Company stock. The advance of the Tokyo
14) Richard C. Hanson, Okura Erito Hokori to Guko [The Pride and Folly of Japan's Finance 
   Ministry Elite] (Tokyo: TBS Buritanika, 1996), pp.87-89; Katsumi Kawano, Kin yu Jiyuka 
   Senryaku no Kiketsu [Consequence of Financial Liberalization Strategy] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 
   1995), pp.125-126; Ushio Shiota, 1993, Okurasho no Fukaku [Blunder of the Ministry of 
   Finance] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1993), pp.54-56. 
15) Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Kabu wa Shindaka [Did Stocks Die?] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
   Shimbunsha, 1991), p.35. 
16) Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Kabu wa Shindaka, p.84.
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Electric Power Company stock led to an increase of the sales price of the NTT 
stock easily. In November 1986, the initial public offering price of the NTT stock 
was determined at 1,197,000 yen. As a matter of fact, the research departments of
most securities companies had written reports that 700 or 800 thousands yen was a 
reasonable price of it. Yet, the Ministry of Finance prevented them from publishing 
their reports 17). After that, the price of it continued to improve and speculative 
investment on the stock exchange became very popular in Japan. 
  On October 19, 1987, the New York Stock Exchange collapsed. On the 
following day, the stock price dropped in the Tokyo Stock Exchange likewise. The 
executives of both the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and the major 
four securities companies had a regular meeting on that day. They decided that the 
fixed limit of proprietary trading would be eased and securities companies would 
prop up share prices by tacit agreement. Also, the securities companies arranged for 
themselves not to send selling orders to the stock market'8 . Securities companies 
sold stocks to amateur investors on a large scale19). Moreover, the Ministry of 
Finance pressed investment companies to purchase shares20). Hereby, stock prices 
rallied. 
  The Ministry of Finance had to keep the stock prices in order not only to head 
off a worldwide recession but also to keep the NTT stock at a higher price. It would 
be on November 20 that the second tranche of the sales of the NTT stocks would be 
taken place. In fact, the Ministry of Finance tried to keep the price of the NTT stock 
by calling on institutional investors not to sell the NTT stocks21). In the end, the 
NTT stocks sold for 2,250,000 yen and the government got about 5 trillion yen221. 
  At the end of December 1987, life insurance companies tarted to sell stocks in 
bulk in order to cover the loss of dollar earnings and corporate investment funds. In 
April 1987, the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance already instructed firms 
to change the accounting standard from cost purchase accounting to lower colt 
accounting next March. The Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance worried 
about sell-off of shares. It asked the Banking Bureau for changing the accounting
17) Takao Saito, Kuni ga Daniashita [The Government Deceived] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1993), 
   pp.83-94. 
18) Shiota, Okurasho no Fukaku, pp.38-48; Takashi Tachibana, Dojidai wo Utsu [Criticizing the 
   Contemporary Affairs] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988), p.268. 
19) Tachibana, Dojidai wo Utsu, pp.263-268. 
20) Ibid., pp.269-274. 
21) Juzo Arihara, Okurasho Yuragu Soshiki to Seisaku [The Ministry of Finance: Its Institution and 
   Policy Waver] (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1996), pp. 108-109. 
22) Shiota, Okurasho no Fukaku, pp. 150-160; Tachibana, Dojidai wo Utsu, pp.287-292.
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standard again. Therefore, the Banking Bureau instructed firms to postpone the 
introduction of lower cost accounting until April 1. Because of this instruction, 
companies did not need to write down and life insurance companies did not have to 
sell stocks by the gross231. 
  These measures taken by the Ministry of Finance got acclaim in the United 
States and Europe in those days because they contributed to heading off a 
worldwide recession24). However, they made the markets believe that the Ministry 
of Finance never would let stock prices drop, which caused stock prices to surge 
after that.
2.2. Surging Land Prices
  The skyrocketing land prices in 1980's started from areas around Tokyo. Since 
1982, the land prices of business districts in Tokyo had shot up. After that, soaring 
land prices spread to residential districts in Tokyo. In the late 1980's, land prices 
skyrocketed all over the country at last25). Why did the land prices of business 
districts in Tokyo rise sharply in the early 1980's? 
  In the early 1980's, foreign financial institutions expanded into Tokyo owing to 
financial internationalization and financial deregulation in Japan. This caused the 
lack of office buildings in Tokyo. In the first place, the business activities in Japan 
concentrated in Tokyo and the rate of operation of offices there had exceeded 100% 
already26). 
  In addition, it had an impact on land prices that Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone started urban renewal (so-called Urban Renaissance). The Nakasone 
Administration deregulated land utilization and building standards, disposed of 
state-owned land, and advanced large-scale development projects in the urban 
area27). In May 1985, the National Land Agency published "The Capital Reform 
Project" and announced the overly-inflated emand forecast of office buildings in
23) Arihara, Okurasho Yuragu Soshiki to Seisaku, p.112; Hanson, Okura Erito Hokori to Guko, 
   pp.107-117; Ishizawa, Za MOF, pp.276-278; Shiota, Okurasho no Fukaku, pp.49-61. 
24) Hanson, Okura Erito Hokori to Guko, pp. 117-118. 
25) Yukio Noguchi, Tochi no Keizaigkau [Economics of Land] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 
   1989), pp.52-54. 
26) Nihon Ginko (Bank of Japan), "Waga Kuni ni okeru Kin-nen no Chika Josho no Haikei to Eikyo 
   ni tsuite" [About the Background and Influence of Surging Land Prices Recently in Our Country], 
   Chosa Geppo, April, 1990: 34-85. 
27) Hideo Otake, Jitvushugi teki Kaikaku no Jidai [The Era of Liberal Reforms] (Tokyo: Chuo 
   Koronsha, 1994), pp. 189-211.
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Tokyo 28~. These brought on surge in land prices of business districts there. 
  This soaring land prices in commercial districts spread to residential districts 
because people who had sold their lands for constructing office buildings got land 
for living 29~. Then, real estate speculation intensified and contributed to further rises 
in land prices3o) 
  The land prices in Japan tended to rise easily because of both the land tax 
system which hindered effective utilization of land31) and the myth of ever-higher 
land prices (Tochi Shinwa)321. In this situation, it had so decisive influence on surge 
in land prices that banks increased real estate loans rapidly. Because financial 
deregulation had large companies obtain financing from the market, banks became 
unable to lend money to them and increased real estate loans instead33> 
  Masaru Yoshitomi argued that not monetary ease by the Bank of Japan but the 
run-up in asset prices caused excess liquidity34). That is, soaring asset prices 
enabled asset holders to borrow money on security of their assets. They bought land 
and stocks additionally with the money and asset prices rose further. Thus, both 
financial assets and financial iabilities increased in a spiral35> 
  Low interest rates were not responsible for the advent of asset inflation but for 
the expansion of the bubble economy by reducing the cost of speculation. Surge in 
land prices and stock prices had différent reasons and reflected actual demand 
partially. Hence, it was difficult for the Bank of Japan to regard monetary easing as 
the main cause of soaring asset prices. Therefore, it was hard for the Bank of Japan 
to become aware that it should tighten monetary policy in order to drive down the 
asset prices.
28) Kishi, Kenjin Tachi no Gosan, pp.169-193; Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Han-i naki Ayamachi 
   [Mistake without Malice] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2000), pp.40-44; Soichiro Tahara, 
   Heisei Nihon no Kanryo [Bureaucracy in Japan in Heisei Era] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju),pp.201-
  224. 
29) Kawano, Kin yu Jiyuka Senryaku no Kiketsu, p.72; Noguchi, Tochi no Keizaigkau, p.54. 
30) Noguchi, Tochi no Keizaigkau, p.55. 
31) Ibid., pp. 129-174. 
32) Kawano, Kin yu Jiyuka Senryaku no Kiketsu, pp.73-74. 
33) Koetsu Aizawa, Nichigin-Ho Nijugo-Jo Hatsudo [Exercising the Article 25 of the Bank of Japan 
   Law] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1995), pp.129-136; Yoshikawa, Tenkan-ki no Nihon Keizai, 
   pp.61-62. 
34) Masaru Yoshitomi, Nihon Keizai no Shinjitsu [Truth about Japanese Economy] (Tokyo: Toyo 
   Keizai Shimposha, 1998), pp.52-96. 
35) Yoshikazu Miyazaki, Kokumin Keizai no Tasogare [National Economy in the Twilight] (Tokyo: 
   Asahi Shimbunsha, 1995), p.163; Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Kabu Nia Shindaka, p.85.
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3. Monetary Policymaking Process from the Plaza Accord to Black Monday
  In this section, I will show the process through which monetary policy was 
formulated from the Plaza Accord in September 1985 to Black Monday in October 
1987. The Bank of Japan lowered its official discount rate five times; in January 
1986, March 1986, April 1986, November 1986, and February 1987. Akira Sato, a 
journalist who interviewed people involved in monetary policy making, states that 
the two decisions of lowering the official discount rate in November 1986 and 
February 1987 were taken without discussions within the Bank of Japan36). These 
two devisions were reputed to be wrong from the viewpoint of preventing the 
bubble economy37). I will examine whether the Bank of Japan made these decisions 
autonomously or the Ministry of Finance forced the Bank of Japan to make these 
decisions. 
  The Reagan's first Administration adopted strong dollar policy. This policy 
weakened the international competitiveness of manufacturing industry. The 
Congress conservatized because industrial circles lobbied hard for protectionism38). 
Moreover, since the U.S. became a net debtor nation, it was believed that the deficit 
in the current account would cause outflow of foreign capital and that the economic 
condition would worsen by rising in interest rates 39). Therefore, the Reagan's 
second Administration changed this policy. 
  In September 1985, the Plaza Accord was reached in which G5 countries agreed 
to appreciate non-dollar currencies against he dollar by joint interventions. Japan 
accepted a stronger yen in a positive way. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone had 
aspired to "strong yen" previously40) and Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita who
36) Sato, Dokyumento Kin-yu Hatan, p.335. 
37) Sec, for example, Toshihiko Yoshino, "Sengo no Nichigin Sosai wa Nani wo Nashita ka" [What 
   did the Governors of Bank of Japan after the Second World War Achieve?], Ekonomisuto, 
   December 26, 1989: 50-54. 
38) 1. M. Destler and C. Randall Henning, Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Polic.ymaking in the United 
   States (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1989), pp.33-41; Yoichi 
   Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1988), pp.98-106 [English version, 
   Yoichi Funabashi, Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre (Washington, D.C.: 
   Institute for International Economics, 1988)]; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi" [Plaza Accord]. In 
   Sono Toki Nihon tiva: Dai 6 Kan [Japan at that time, vol.6] (Tokyo: NHK, 1996) pp.17-21. 
39) Naoko lshii, Seisaku K>>ocho n  Keizaigaku [Economics of Policy Coordination] (Tokyo: Nihon 
   Keizai Shimbunsha, 1990), pp.25-31; Heizo Takenaka, Nichi-bei Masatsu no Keizaigaku 
   [Economics of Conflict between Japan and the U.S.] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1991), 
   pp.86-92. 
40) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, pp.123-127.
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aimed for becoming next prime minister wanted to show a great diplomatic 
achievement4 ) 
. 
  The value of the dollar did not decline to a large extent immediately in spite of 
the joint interventions and verbal interventions. However, the Bank of Japan had 
induced higher short-terni interest rates since October 24, which triggered the sharp 
appreciation of the yen against he dollar. The Bank of Japan took strong yen policy 
positively because it had not been able to implement monetary policy flexibly due 
to a depreciation of the yen and appreciating yen contributed to price stability. 
Expecting Japan to expand its domestic demand, the U.S. blamed it for a rising of 
short-term interest rates. The Ministry of Finance complained about raising them to 
the Bank of Japan likewise. The Bank of Japan insisted that increasing short-terra 
interest rates helped to raise the value of yen and continued to implement his 
policy until the end of the year42) 
  Within the Bank of Japan, there were two factions of executives. One faction 
which was called "Kokunai-Ha" consisted of executives who specialized in 
domestic affairs. They thought that domestic economy was more important han 
international economy, stabilizing prices was the mission of the Bank of Japan, and 
keeping independence of the Bank of Japan from the government was very 
important in order to stabilize prices. The other faction which was called "Kokusai-
Ha" consisted of executives who specialized in international affairs. They thought 
that Japan had to contribute to the growth of international economy as much as 
possible and implement monetary policy from the internationally cooperative 
standpoint. 
  "Kokunai-Ha" took initiative for this rising of short-term interest rates in 
October 198543). They were afraid that the Bank of Japan might be hampered from 
implementing monetary policy autonomously on the ground of international 
coordination. They demonstrated that raising interest rates triggered a rise of the 
yen against he dollar. 
  Alter that, yen became stronger and stronger. However, trade deficit of the U.S. 
continued to rise and the Reagan Administration stepped up demands for Japan and 
West Germany to expand domestic demand. Prime Minister Nakasone remarked
41) Ibid., pp.133-134. 
42) Ibid., pp.50-51, p.155; Hitoshi Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi [Negotiations on 
   Currency between Japan and the U.S. for 2000 days] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1995), 
   pp.72-77; Ushio Shiota, Okurasho vs. Amerika [The Ministry of Finance vs. the U.S.] (Tokyo: 
   Kodansha, 1994), pp.329-336. 
43) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, p.155; Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi , pp.72-77.
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that industrialized nations should implement coordinated cuts in interest rates on 
December 18, 1985. Finance Minister Takeshita expressed readiness to accept a 
stronger yen. Takeshita and the Ministry of Finance expected that the Bank of 
Japan cut its official discount rate if the yen got stronger, for strong yen stabilized 
prices. Both Nakasone and Takeshita wanted the official discount rate to be lowered 
in order to meet the U.S. demand to expand domestic demand4a)
  Governor of the Bank of Japan Satoshi Sumita, who had served as 
Administrative Vice-Minister of Finance, explored opportunities to cut its official 
discount rate in order to expand domestic demand at that time, but he cared that 
lowering of interest rates only in Japan, not coordinated cuts in interest rates, would 
trigger a rise of the dollar. However, since verbal intervention of Takeshita gave 
rise to a further rise of the yen, the Bank of Japan cut its official discount rate from 
5% to 4.5% a year on January 30, 1986. Furthermore, Japan, the U.S., and West 
Germany implemented coordinated cuts in interest rates in March and the official 
discount rate of the Bank of Japan became 4%. The Bundesbank acceded to 
coordinated cuts in interest rates because inflationary pressure got weaker by reason 
of dropping oil prices45) 
  Though coordinated cuts in interest rates were implemented in March, business 
was weakening in the U.S. owing to decline in oil prices. The Reagan 
Administration began to put pressure upon the Federal Reserve Board in demand 
for additional money-easing. Actualiy, in February 1986, the directors who were 
appointed by President Reagan overruled Chairman Paul Volcker and voted a 
discount rate cut. This is known as the "palace coup." Volcker compromised with 
them on condition that the cut was deferred to give him time to negotiate a 
coordinated réduction with the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan46). He suspected 
that lowering of interest rate only in the U.S. would trigger collapse of the dollar. 
  In April, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker required lowering of interest 
rates of Takeshita. Volcker called on Sumita for it likewise. In Japan at that time, 
the mass media criticized the government for its Jack of policy to excessively strong 
yen because of sharp appreciation of the yen amid growing concems over economic 
slump. The policy to raise the yen had been abandoned and the Bank of Japan had 
already intervened in the foreign exchange market by selling yen independently on
44) Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi , pp.83-91; Shiota, Okurasho vs. Amerika, pp.337-
  346. 
45) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, pp.63-67. 
46) Ibid., pp.67-70; Henning, Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germanv, and Japan, 
   p.284.
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March 1947). Therefore, Takeshita and Sumita viewed these demands as a godsend 
and accepted them48). However, Sumita made promises without conferring with the 
executives of the Bank of Japan. "Kokunai-Ha" in the Bank of Japan began to 
entertain antipathy toward the U.S. as it forced Japan to reduce interest rates. 
However, Govemor Sumita having promised the U.S. rate reduction already, the 
U.S. and Japan implemented coordinated cuts in interest rates on April 21 and the 
official discount rate of the Bank of Japan became 3.5%49> 
  Prime Minister Nakasone found himself in serious straits with House of 
Councilors election around the corner as the yen continued to appreciate. Secretary 
Baker remarked that high dollar rate was corrected sufficiently on May 13 and 20 in 
order to help Nakasone though lie had continued to say that the strong dollar was 
not corrected adequately in order to let the dollar fall in value 50). Then, Baker 
demanded additional money-easing. However, the Bank of Japan rejected this 
demand on the grounds of House of Councilors election. The Ministry of Finance 
called for the Bank of Japan to lower interest rates and tried to make it cut interest 
rates by stopping supplying funding to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
and accepting a stronger yen (in Japan, the Ministry of Finance had the authority to 
decide to intervene in the foreign exchange market and the Bank of Japan put it into 
execution as the Bank received the Finance Ministry's instructions). Nevertheless, 
the Bank of Japan rejected this demand to the last5i> 
  On July 6, the double election (House of Representatives lection and House of 
Councilors election) was held and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won an 
overwhelming victory. Nakasone formed a cabinet on July 22. Takeshita was 
appointed as the LDP Secretary-General nd Kiichi Miyazawa was appointed as 
Finance Minister. 
  On September 6, in talk with Finance Minister Miyazawa, Secretary Baker 
demanded lowering of interest rate and expanding government spending by 
compiling a supplementary budget. At that time, the LDP politicians began to 
request formation of supplementary budget o deal with the appreciation of the yen. 
Prime Minister Nakasone who had been committed to fiscal reconstruction 
admitted their claims. On September 16, the government announced the
47) Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, pp.101-105. 
48) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, pp.70-71. 
49) Makoto Sataka, "Okurasho vs. Nichigin no Anto" [The Secret Strife between the Ministry of 
   Finance and the Bank of Japan], Bungei Shunju, October 1986: 110-120. Sec also, Grimes, 
   Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, p.117; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp. 115-118. 
50) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, pp.225-226; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp.111-114. 
51) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, pp.72-73.
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Comprehensive Economic Measure which included compilation of a supplementary 
budget worth 3.6 trillion. However, it was nothing but a patchwork of various 
estimated costs and the total amount of the actual increase of government spending, 
so-called "real money" was only 130 billions 52). The Ministry of Finance tried to 
avoid issuance of deficit-covering bonds at any colt. However, the Ministry of 
Finance could not help issuing them in the end. 
  In the end of September, G5 and G7 were held in Washington, D.C. and Finance 
Minister Miyazawa and Secretary Baker had a meeting. Though Baker appreciated 
the formation of supplementary budget, lie demanded lowering of interest rates. 
Miyazawa and Volcker requested Governor Sumita to eut interest rates and Sumita 
implied rate reduction in a press conférence on October 153) 
  However, on October 3, Vice-Governor of the Bank of Japan Yasushi Mieno, 
who was the leader of "Kokunai-Ha" and regarded as the next governor, denied the 
possibility of rate reduction with clarity in a statement at the Diet54). Michio Fukai, 
who served as an Executive Director of the Bank of Japan at that time, tells that 
"Kokunai-Ha" and "Kokusai-Ha" joined issue on rate reduction. "Kokunai-Ha" 
insisted that monetary policy should be managed in line with the current conditions 
of the Japanese economy and that lowering of interest rates was not necessary 
because of the sharp rise of money supply and asset prices. On the other hand, 
"Kokunai-Ha" insisted that monetary policy should be managed in concert with the 
U.S55). They did not reach the agreement on this issue and interest rates were left 
unchanged. Then, Yoshihiko Yoshino, Administrative Vice-Minister of Finance, 
instructed by Finance Minister Miyazawa, told Vice-Governor Mieno that 
Governor Sumita had promised Miyazawa lowering of the official discount rate and 
asked Mieno when the rate reduction would be implemented56). As Mieno heard 
that Sumita had promised Miyazawa lowering of interest rates, lie thought hat he 
had no alternative but to agree to lower the official discount rate. On October 31, 
the Bank of Japan decided to eut it to 3%, which was implemented on November 1. 
Miyazawa and Baker released a joint statement which contained exchange rate 
stability on the saine day.
52) Ibid., p.238; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp.124-126; Shiota, Okurasho vs. Amerika, p.387. 
53) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, pp.77-79; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp.128-129; Noguchi, 
   Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, pp. 132-135. 
54) NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp.I27-128; Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, 
   p.135. 
55) Sato, Dokvamaento Kin-i'u Hatan, pp.340-341. 
56) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, p.79.
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  The rise of the yen stopped temporarily thanks to this statement. Though 
Miyazawa made a demand for expanding government spending on budget for the 
FY 1989, Administrative Vice-Minister Yoshino resisted this doggedly and austere 
budget policy was maintained57). Baker perceived that government spending in 
Japan was not expanded sufficiently and began to talk down the dollar. The yen 
appreciated sharply against the dollar again. Miyazawa went to the U.S. and 
negotiated with Baker to stop the rapid appreciation of the yen on January 21, 1987. 
Miyazawa used interest-rate ut to get Baker to cooperate for exchange rate 
stability58). Yet, the outside investors were disaffected to the U.S. weak dollar 
policy. They came to be reluctant o invest in the U.S. market and interest rates 
started to rise59). The U.S. needed to attract foreign investment in order to make up 
for the enormous fiscal deficit. Therefore, it was about time that the U.S. stabilized 
exchange rates. 
  On February 20, 1987, the Bank of Japan decided to eut its official discount rate 
to a record low of 2.5%, which was implemented on February 23. Sumita laid in a 
press conférence that this rate reduction was near to the limit and implied that 
expanding overnment spending was required in order to expand domestic demand 
and stabilize exchange rate 60). Yoshio Suzuki, who served as Director-General of 
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan at that time, states that 
Miyazawa and Sumita had decided to lower the official discount rate and the 
executives of the Bank including Suzuki were able to do nothing about it61). On 
February 22, G6 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed to 
cooperate closely to foster stability of exchange rates around current levels (the 
Louvres Accord). 
  However, the yen continued to appreciate against he dollar and the U.S. trade 
deficit with Japan was not diminished. On April 8, FRB Chairman Volcker 
requested Governor Sumita to lower the official discount rate, but Sumita declined. 
Though the U.S., Finance Minister Miyazawa, and the Ministry of Finance 
continued to demand rate reduction of the Bank of Japan with insistence, the Bank 
continued to refuse6Z).
57) Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, pp.140-141; Shiota, Okurasho vs. Amerika, pp.387-
  390. 
58) NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," p.135. 
59) Ibid., p.137. 
60) Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 1987. 
61) Kishi, Kenjin Tachi no Gosan, p.43. 
62) NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," p.143; Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, pp.172-
  173.
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  Miyazawa had promised Baker to increase public spending on economic pump-
priming measures. Nakasone realized that expanding government spending was 
necessary in order to stop the rise of the yen. LDP politicians voiced a strong desire 
to expand it. The government decided for compiling a supplementary budget worth 
6 trillion on May 29, 198763). However, the Japanese economy began to recover 
from the beginning of 1987. Thus, it is laid that this expanding fiscal expenditure 
was overabundant and overheated economy64) 
  Vice-Governor of the Bank of Japan Mieno was cautious about inflation and 
warned that it was as if Japanese economy was sitting on dry firewood. In summer 
1987, the executives of the Bank of Japan began to lay the groundwork for the 
decision of raising its official discount rate. They stressed the risk of increasing 
inflationary pressure 65). The Bank guided the short-term interest rates higher in the 
market from the end of August66> 
  In the U.S., on the other hand, the new FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan raised 
interest rates in September. However, the dollar depreciated. Then, the U.S. 
government requested Japan and West Germany to reduce interest rates. Both 
countries declined and the Bundesbank performed an operation for increasing in the 
short-term interest rates in the market. Secretary Baker resented this and stated that 
the U.S. tolerated a weaker dollar on October 16. Investors recognized that this 
statement meant the failure of international policy coordination and they moved 
their financial assets out of the U.S. for fear of collapse of the dollar. This caused 
the heavy fall in the New York Stock Exchange on October 19 (Black Monday)671. 
The depreciation of the dollar continued after that and inflated asset prices and 
bond prices collapsed in the U.S. Then, Secretary Baker persuaded West Germany 
to lower the short-term interest rates68) 
. 
  Governor Sumita decided to stop guiding the short-term interest rates higher69) 
The Ministry of Finance blamed the Bank of Japan for Black Monday. The
63) Funabashi 1988, pp.142-150; Kishi, Kenjin Tachi no Gosan, pp.15-40; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza 
   Goi," pp. 145-154. 
64) Arihara, Okurasho Yuragu Soshiki to Seisaku, p.88. 
65) Masayoshi Mizuno, Nichigin Himerareta "Hanran" [Bank of Japan: Hidden Revolt] (Tokyo: Jiji 
   Tsushinsha, 1997), p.169. 
66) Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, and Shigenori Shiratsuka, "Shisan Kakaku Baburu to Kin-yu 
   Seisaku" [The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy], Kin-vu Kenkvu 19, vol.4 (2000): 261-
  322. 
67) NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp. 158-160. 
68) Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, pp.201-205. 
69) Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Han-i naki Avamachi, p.33.
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executives of the Ministry said that Vice-Governor Mieno who was ignorant about 
international economy gave rise to confusion by emphasizing the alarm over 
inflation 70). This crash in stock prices deprived the Bank of Japan of the opportunity 
to raise its official discount rate. 
  Hereinafter, I will examine whether the Bank of Japan from the Plaza Accord to 
Black Monday was subject e, the Ministry of Finance or not. Within the Bank of 
Japan, it was commonly said that the Bank itself decided to reduce its official 
discount rate in January 1986, March 1986, and April 1986, yet Finance Minister 
Miyazawa colluding with Governor Sumita decided to reduce its rate in November 
1986 and February 198771. Yoshio Suzuki tells that seeking the advice of Vice-
Governor Mieno, Governor Sumita decided to reduce its rate from January 1986 to 
April 1986, but that he decided to reduce its rate in November 1986 and February 
1987 without debate72). Was Governor Sumita forced to reduce its rate by Finance 
Minister Miyazawa? Did he accept Miyazawa's requests against his own will? 
  However, these rate reductions were not necessarily unreasonable.When home 
currency surges, it is common for the country to loosen monetary policy in order to 
deal with the deflationary effect. Even the Bundesbank which was regarded as the 
mort independent central bank loosened monetary policy from 1975 to 1978 and 
from 1986 to 1988 when the mark soared against he dollar73) 
. 
   An possible objection against his argument will be that the Bank of Japan 
lowered its official discount rate five times, yet the Bundesbank lowered its rate 
only twice after the Plaza Accord, and that this fact is the evidence that the Bank of 
Japan was much less independent than the Bundesbank. 
  However, I can counter this objection.First, it was not West Germany but Japan 
that was borne the brunt of attack by the U.S. Congress owing te, its large trade 
surplus with the U.S.74) It was natural that the U.S. put greater pressure on Japan to
loosen monetary policy than on West Germany. Second, and more critically, the 
degree of dependence on trade with the U. S. of Japan was higher than that of West 
Gennany75) and the ratio of export in terms of dollar of Japan was much higher than
70) Mizuno, Nichigin Himerareta "Hanran, "p. 169. 
71) Sato, Dokyuniento Kin-yu Hatan, p.335. 
72) Ushio Shiota ed. Kinri wo Ugokasu Otokotachi [Men Operating Interest Rates] (Tokyo: Kanki 
   Shuppan, 1992), pp.38-39. 
73) Ben Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin, "Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary 
   Policy: Observation from Six Industrial Countries." In NBER Macroecononiics Annual 
   (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 183-228. 
74) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, p.157; NHK Shuzai-Han, "Puraza Goi," pp.17-18. 
75) Yoshiko Kojo, Keizaiteki Sogo Izon to Kokka [Economic Interdependence and State] (Tokyo:
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that of West Germany76). Thus, export industries in Japan suffered more serious 
damage than those in West Germany from the depreciation of the dollar. Therefore, 
the Bank of Japan gave more serions consideration to negative effect of the weak 
dollar on the economy than the Bundesbank did. 
  Nonetheless, it was true that there was a conflict between the Bank of Japan and 
the Ministry of Finance over managing monetary policy. Hence, I examine two 
cases in November 1986 and in February 1987, which are said that the Ministry 
forced the Bank to reduce the official discount rate. On October 1, 1986, Governor 
Sumita who was requested to lower the official discount rate implied rate reduction. 
However, "Kokunai-Ha" including Vice-Governor Mieno strongly opposed it and 
the decision was delayed. In the end, Mieno approved it in the end of October 
because he was informed that Governor Sumita had promised it to Finance Minister 
Miyazawa. In February 1987, Governor Sumita determined to accept Miyazawa's 
request for lowering the official discount rate on his own judgment without 
consulting Vice-Governor Mieno. Governor Sumita decided these rate reductions 
against he will of "Kokunai-Ha" within the Bank. 
  The reason why Governor Sumita decided these rate reductions was not that 
Finance Minister Miyazawa, the Ministry of Finance, and the U.S. forced him to do 
them, for he was a former Administrative Vice-Minister of Finance and regarded as 
a man of influence. Moreover, he was a senior bureaucrat of Miyazawa in the 
Ministry of Finance 77) . His determinations to reduce the official discount rate were 
based on his appreciation of the economical situation. That is, he determined them 
to stop the sharp appreciation of the yen, attaching reat importance to deflationary 
effect of the strong yen. 
  On the contrary, "Kokunai-Ha" opposed monetary easing because it expected 
that excessively easy monetary policy would cause inflation and was worried that 
the independence of the Bank of Japan would be undermined if the Bank of Japan 
would accept the U.S. demand for monetary easing. On the other hand, "Kokusai-
Ha" within the Bank agreed to lower the official discount rate since it gave priority 
to international policy coordination. 
  The Bank of Japan Law at the time gave the Policy Board final responsibility for 
monetary policy operation of the Bank. However, the Policy Board had lapsed into 
the practice of following the recommendations made by the executive board of
   Bokutakusha, 1996), pp. 165-166. 
76) Yoshikazu Miyazaki, Doru to En [Dollar and Yen] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), p.130. 
77) Funabashi, Tsuka Retsuretsu, p.80.
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directors representing several departments within the Bank7). In addition, articles 
of the Bank of Japan prescribed governor's control over the executive board of 
directors. Therefore, Governor Sumita was able to make policy decisions from the 
top-down. In addition, "Kokusai-Ha" endorsed his decisions. 
  In many cases, the Bank of Japan resisted pressures from the Ministry of 
Finance, Finance Minister, and the U.S. First, in spite of the opposition of the 
Ministry of Finance and the U.S., the Bank continued to guide the short-term 
interest rates higher from fall 1985 to the end of the year. Second, the Bank rejected 
the demands for rate reduction from the U.S. and the Ministry in May and June 
1986. The Ministry tried to make the Bank lower its official discount rate by 
stopping supplying funding to intervene in the foreign exchange market, but the 
Bank did not obey the Ministry. Third, the Bank had refused the Ministry and the 
U.S. demands for lowering the official discount rate since April 1987. In February 
1987, Governor Sumita proposed to the government that the appreciation of the yen 
should be dealt with not by monetary policy but by fiscal policy from then. 
  These cases show that the Ministry of Finance did not have means of forcing the 
Bank of Japan to implement monetary policy which the Ministry wished and the 
Bank of Japan was able to implement the policy which it would like. The former 
Bank of Japan Law gave the Ministry of Finance the authority for supervising the 
Bank of Japan and ordering it to undertake any necessary business. Yet, in practice, 
these powers were not carried out in the policy making.
4. Why Had Not the Official Discount Rate Been Raised for 2 Years and 3 
  Months?
  In February 1987, the Bank of Japan lowered its official discount rate to 2.5% 
and kept the rate at that level until May 1989. It is said that this excessively loose 
monetary policy drastically increased financial liquidity, stimulating a rapid 
increase in the prices of land and stocks. In previous section, I explained that Black 
Monday deprived the Bank of Japan of the opportunity to raise the rate. However, 
stocks in Tokyo bounced back early by the Finance Ministry's measures to bolster 
stock market prices and stock prices soared in 1988. Why did not the Bank of Japan 
raise the rate in 1988? 
  It is the widely-accepted explanation that the Bank of Japan was forced not to
78) Thomas F. Cargill, Michael M. Hutchison, and Takatoshi Ito, Financial Polict' and Central 
   Bankinx in Japan (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), p.89.
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raise the rate by political pressures. Yoshio Suzuki, who served as an Executive 
Directors of the Bank of Japan at that time, states as follows. Increase in interest 
rates had not been discussed at the executive board of directors. He fell to thinking 
that the official discount rate should be raised. Yet, lie did not advocate this idea 
and refrained from saying outside the Bank of Japan that he cared about inflation, 
for lie feared that the Bank of Japan and Vice-Governor Mieno would be criticized 
further if the Bank of Japan alone advocated raising its official discount rate as the 
Ministry of Finance had already blamed Mieno for Black Monday and calls for 
international policy coordination were growing among the Ministry of Finance and 
journalism in 1988791. 
  Mikio Wakatsuki, who served as Adjutant General of the Bank of Japan at that 
time, remarks as follows. Though he had explored opportunities to raise the official 
discount rate since the middle of 1988, lie got no feeling that the Ministry of 
Finance accepted it because the Ministry wanted to introduce the consumption tax 
without much trouble. An official of the Ministry of Finance said to him that the 
Bank of Japan would go against the efforts to expand domestic demand, Japan 
being chastised for its large trade surplus. Although he stressed the soaring land 
prices, the Ministry of Finance answered that only the land prices in Tokyo had 
surged and that it was natural because Tokyo was getting the financial center which 
matched New York and London80) 
. 
  Akira Sato, who interviewed directors of the Bank of Japan at that time, argues 
as follows. The directors of the Bank of Japan heard secondhand that the executive 
officiais of the Ministry of Finance and the caucus of the LDP remarked off the 
record that Vice-Governor Mieno, who repeated that increase in interest rates was 
needed in order to prevent inflation, was not suited to be the governor of the Bank 
of Japan. Sato concludes that the less independence of the Bank of Japan was the 
cause of holding the official discount rate steady81) 
  The government and the Ministry of Finance opposed rise in interest rates for 
the following remous. First, Japan-U.S. trade friction was igniting. Office of the 
United States Trade Representative intended to identify Japan as an "unfair trading 
country," based on Super 301 clause of the Omnibus Trade Act. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry which negotiated with the U.S., the Ministry of 
Finance which was afraid of being demanded expanding government spending, and
79) Mizuno, Nichigin Himerareta "Hamran, "p. 169. 
80) Takeshi Yamawaki, Nihon Ginko no Shinjitsu [Truth about Bank of Japan] (Tokyo: 
   Daiyamondosha, 1998), pp.21-22. 
81) Sato, Doknuniento Kin-vu Hatan, pp.343-345.
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Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita were concerned that the U.S. would recognize 
increase in the official discount rate as abandonment of policy to expand domestic 
demand. Second, the Ministry of Finance faced the opposition parties' objection 
against introduction of the consumption tax. The opposition parties argued that the 
tax would encourage follow-up price hikes. It was unfavorable for the Ministry of 
Finance that the Bank of Japan announced inflation worries since this reinforced the 
argument of the opposition parties"). Third, the International Finance Bureau of the 
Ministry of Finance supported the international opinion that Japan should not raise 
interest rates to the last in order to shore up the world economy83). 
  Under such circumstances, it was difficult for the Bank of Japan to raise its 
official discount rate. However, there are no evidences that the Bank of Japan tried 
to raise the rate and that the Ministry of Finance or the LDP prevented the Bank 
from it. In fact, the executives of the Bank did not reach an agreement on it. 
  Takashi Ota, Executive Director who was in charge of international affairs, 
made strong opposition to it. He argued that it would lead to collapse of the 
dollar84). The executives of the Bank of Japan consider his argument o be very 
persuasive because increase in short-term interest rates in West Germany had 
caused the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange on October 19, 198785). Vice-
Governor Mieno stated afterward that the Bank of Japan could not help taking 
account of the possibility that tight monetary policy in Japan would have adverse 
effects on the world economy after the shock of Black Monday86). Even Yoshio 
Suzuki singled out the possibility of collapse in the value of the dollar as the main 
reason for keeping the official discount rate steady in his book87) 
. 
  Within the Bank of Japan, the executives were divided into two factions on 
increasing the official discount rate. Six Directors-Generals had a secret meeting 
within the Bank every Tuesday in 1988. In the second half of 1988, increase in the 
official discount rate was discussed at the meeting. Three Directors-Generals, who 
belonged to "Kokunai-Ha," advocated interest rate increase on the grounds that the 
U.S. and West Germany raised interest rates and asset prices continued to soar. On
82) Mizuno, Nichigin Himerareta "Hanran, " p.170. 
83) Noguchi, Nichi-bei Tsuka Kosho 2000 Nichi, pp.229-230. 
84) Mizuno, Nichigin Himerareta -Hanran, "pp.171-172. 
85) Sato,.Dokyumento Kin-yu Hatan, pp.342. 
86) Yasushi Mieno, Nihon Keizai to Chuo Ginko [Japanese Economy and Central Bank] (Tokyo: 
   Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1995), pp.38-39. 
87) Yoshio Suzuki, Nihon Keizai no Saisei [Rebirth of Japanese Economy] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai 
   Shimposha, 1992), pp.19-24; Yoshio Suzuki, Nihon no Kin-vu Seisaku [Japanese Monetary 
   Policy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), p.100.
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the other hand, three Directors-Generals including Wakatsuki, who belonged to 
"Kokusai-Ha," objected interest rate hike based on the reasons tated below. First, 
international cooperation has to be kept. Second, the consumption tax that will be 
introduced in April 1989 will have a negative impact on the economy. Third, both 
wholesale prices and consumer prices are stable 88). 
  It has been often said that the Bundesbank had raised its official discount rate 
four times before the Bank of Japan raised the rate of it in May 1989. The 
Bundesbank succeeded in raising the rate swiftly without respect o politicians who 
were reluctant o raise the rate in consideration of the relationship with the U.S., as 
opposed to the Bank of Japan. This différence is perceived to be derived from the 
différent level of independence of them89) . However, this argument neglects the 
différence between the yen-dollar rate and the mark-dollar rate. Throughout he 
year, the dollar had been so weak and seemed on the point of tumbling against he 
yen, though it had been stabilized against he mark90). Thus, the Bundesbank could 
raise interest rates leaving the exchange rate out of consideration. The yen-dollar 
rate was stable temporarily in summer 1988, to be sure, but it was worried that the 
yen would soar again911. In fact, the yen rose sharply again since October and 
reached a peak on November 1792). The Bank of Japan had to guide short-term 
interest rates to lower in order to stop the dollar's depreciation against he yen93) 
  More importantly, in West Germany, import prices began to rise owing to the 
weak mark. Thus, tight monetary policy was implemented as preventative measure 
for putting brakes on the lower mark and eliminating the growing inflationary 
mentality94). On the contrary, prices of commodities never rose in Japan in spite of 
the asset inflation. There were some reasons of this. First, the strong yen and 
declining oil prices brought prices down. Second, wages were held down relatively 
to the buoyant economy9sl. Third, inflationary expectations did not rise because the
88) Norifumi Tsukada interviewed Jun-ichi Miyake who had served as Director-General of Institute 
   for Monetary and Economic Studies at that time (September 10, 2001). 
89) Sec, for example, Henning, Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germant', and Japon, 
   p.323; Mizuno, Nichigin Hinierareta -Hanran, " pp. 173-175; Sato, Dokyumento Kin-yu Hatan, 
   pp.342-344; Yamawaki, Nihon Ginko no Shinjitsu, pp.20-21. 
90) Takashi Ota, Kokusai Kin-yu Genba kara no Shogen [International Finance: Testimony front the 
   Scene] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1991), pp. l 17-119; Suzuki, Nihon Keizai no Saisei, pp.20-22; 
   Suzuki, Nihon no Kin-yu Seisaku, pp.96-98. 
91) Asahi Shimbun, September 9, 1988. 
92) Asahi Shimbun, November 18, 1988. 
93) Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 1988, October 20, 1988. 
94) Asahi Shimbun, July 1, 1988. 
95) Kazuo Ueda, Kokusai Shushi Fu-kinko ka no Kin vu Seisaku [Monetary Policy under Unbalance
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Bank of Japan had built up a high reputation as a price-stabilizing central bank over 
the past 20 years96) 
  Now, we need recall the causes of the soaring of land prices and stock prices I 
argued in Chapter 2. It is incorrect that the Bundesbank's tightening monetary 
policy prevented asset price inflation. In West Germany at that time, stock trading 
was not active and strict regulations were imposed on land use. That is, there were 
no fundamentals that inflated the stock and land prices in West Germany971. In 
Japan, excess liquidity by low interest rates was absorbed by stock market 
investment and real estate investment and did not raise inflationary expectations, 
but in West Germany, excess liquidity by low interest rates raised inflationary 
expectations. Therefore, the Bundesbank raised interest rates to curb accelerating 
inflation. 
  Most economists argued that the Bank of Japan should have pursued a tight 
monetary policy on the grounds of the rapid growth in monetary aggregates in the 
second half of the I980's981. However, the Bank of Japan managed monetary policy
with the emphasis not on the money supply but on the short-term interest rates 
because it believed that central banks could not control the money supply. It 
insisted that increase in demand for fund caused the rapid growth in monetary 
aggregates99)
  To be sure in 1975, the Bank of Japan announced a new monetary-policy 
procedure emphasizing the importance of the money supply as a fundamental 
determinant of inflation and the usefulness of monetary growth as an intermediate 
policy indicator. It is said that the Bank of Japan had implemented "money-
focused" monetary policy since then. However, Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito argue 
that the Bank of Japan focused on interest rates and did not adhere to k% rule 
between 1975 and 1986. Its operations were not monetarist. Cargill et al. conclude 
that the Bank of Japan achieved the objective of price stability by nonmonetarist
   of Payments Equilibrium] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1992), pp.186-187; Hiroshi 
   Yoshikawa ed., Kin-yu Seisaku to Nihon Keizai [Monetary Policy and Japanese Economy] 
   (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1996), pp.143-144. 
96) Kazuhide Uekusa, Kinri Kawase Kabuka no Seiji Keizaigaku [Political Economy of Interest 
   Rates, Currency Exchange, and Stock Prices] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp.36-37,pp.93-
  94. 
97) Aizawa, Nichigin-Ho Nijugo-Jo Hatsudo, pp.84-93. 
98) See, for example, Kikuo Iwata, Kin-yu Seisaku no Keizaigaku [Economics of Monetary Policy] 
   (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1993). 
99) Sec, for example, Kunio Okina, Kin-yu Seisaku [Monetary Policy] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai 
   Shimposha, 1993).
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means 100) 
  In 1980's, the advance in financial liberalization weakened the relationship 
between the money supply and commodity prices and diluted the validity of the 
money supply as an intermediate policy indicator101). In other industrial nations, 
central banks abandoned any attempt to target monetary aggregates102) Moreover, 
the Bank of Japan might interpret the monetary increase as portfolio shifts triggered 
by deregulation103). Mieno himself acknowledged it afterward104). Thus, restrictive 
monetary policy was not pursued in spite of the rapid money growth. 
  Because "Kokunai-Ha" within the Bank of Japan, including Vice-Governor 
Mieno, was cautious about the increase in commodity prices, its arguments against 
low interest rates were hardly convincing as commodity prices were very stable 
despite soaring asset prices. In those days, the inflated asset prices were viewed not 
as causes of the wide economic fluctuations, the nonperforming loan problem, or 
the financial instability in the future, but as detriments to equity in income 
distribution and property and as causes of inflation in the future105). Therefore, the 
rapid money growth was neglected and most people did not think that bubble 
economy had to be burst as early as possible. 
  Satoshi Sumita mentions that monetary easing was necessary to correct the 
imbalance of international payments and to avoid collapse of the dollar. He 
emphasizes that commodity prices were stable and the inflation rate was about 0% 
for three years since 1986106). Yasushi Mieno remarks that people did not become 
aware easily that the excess liquidity was focused on the asset market because the 
inflation rate based on consumer price index hardly rise thanks to the strong yen107). 
He also says that wholesale prices were negative growth and both the government 
and the private sectors considered it strange that the Bank of Japan took monetary 
policy in order to control asset prices108). Hence, he concludes that he considers
100) Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, The Political Econonty of Japanese Monetary Policy, pp.35-49. 
101) Mitsuaki Okabe, Kankyo Henka to Nihon no Kin-yu [Environmental Changes and Finance in 
   Japan] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1999), p.493. 
102) Alan S. Blinder, Central Banking in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 
    pp.26-29; Okina, Kin-yu Seisaku, pp. 153-157. 
103) Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, The Political Econoniy of Japanese Monetary Policy, p.57. 
104) Yasushi Mieno, Gi wo Mite Ri wo Omou [Seeing Social Obligations to Ponder about Interest 
    Rate] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 1999), p.84. 
105) Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka, "Shisan Kakaku Baburu to Kin-yu Seisaku." 
106) Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 29, 1993. 
107) Mieno, Nihon Keizai to Chuo Ginko, p.38. 
108) Mizuno, Nichigin Hinierareta "Hauran, " pp. 166-167; Okina, Kin .yu Seisaku, pp. 165-166.
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long-term easy monetary policy to be inevitable and reasonable to a certain degree 
because of the sharp appreciation of the yen, the stability of commodity prices, and 
the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange on Black Monday109> 
   It was common knowledge that central banks should not use monetary policy to 
stabilize asset prices since asset prices are determined by various factors other than 
interest rates110). Moreover, loosening monetary policy by the Bank of Japan was 
not the root cause of the asset inflation in those days. There were a lot of factors 
which led to it before the Bank eased money, as I argued in Chapter 2. Thus, the 
Bank of Japan thought that it reflected the actual demand to a considerable extent. 
Accordingly, the Bank could not regard it as the bubble phenomenon caused by 
loosening monetary policy, and was not able to see the need to curb it by tightening 
monetary policy. 
  In fact, it is said that Yoshio Suzuki told in 1987 that the increase in stock prices 
and land prices was natural because incomes of Japanese rose"). i). He also told that 
soaring land costs in Tokyo was not caused by speculations on land but reflected 
the added value of it and that rise in stock prices and land prices helped to put the 
economy on track for recovery112) 
   Akira Kanno, who served as an Executive Director of the Bank of Japan at the 
time, tells that he thought that the rapid appreciation of stock prices merely 
reflected re-evaluation of Tokyo stock market and that the rise in land prices was 
the outcome of productivity growth of land typified by demand for office buildings, 
which also reflected re-evaluation of the Japanese economy113) 
  Nobuhito Kishi reports that in face of stable wholesale price index and 
consumer price index, there were few opinions in the meetings of executive 
directors that monetary policy should be used to deal with the asset price inflation. 
He also reports that rise in the official discount rate began to be discussed within 
the Bank of Japan in the end of 1988114).
109) Mieno, Gi wo Mite Ri wo Omou, pp.206-207. 
110) Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, The Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy, p.113; 
    Mitsuaki Okabe, "Kin-yu Kankyo no Henka to Kin-yu Seisaku" [Environmental Changes in 
    Finance and Monetary Policy]. In Yoshio Suzuki, and Mitsuaki Okabe eds., Jissen Zeminaru 
    Nihon no Kin-yu [Practical Seminar: Finance in Japan] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha), 
    pp.245-289. 
111) Atsushi Yamada and Soichiro Tahara, Nihon Soi Haiboku [Japan Lost Again] (Tokyo: Bungei 
    Shunju, 1998), p.147. 
112) Mizuno, Nichigin Hinierareta "Hanran, " p.171. 
113) Kishi, Kenjin Tachi no Gosan, p.53. 
114) Ibid., pp.53-54.
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  In fact, the Bank of Japan announced its intention not to raise its official 
discount rate in July and August 1988 when the Bundesbank increased interest 
rates, pointing out the stability of commodity prices and the différence between the 
yen-dollar rate and the mark-dollar rate1151. In September 1988, Mikio Wakatsuki 
told in an interview that Japan did not endure raising the official discount rate 
though Japan was rated highly for not following rise in interest rates in the U.S. and 
West Gennany. He explained that Japan did not have to raise it in the current 
economic environment1161. 
  These facts show that the Bank of Japan was not forced to keep an easy money 
policy by the Ministry of Finance, the LDP politicians, and the U.S., and that it did 
not raise its official discount rate on its own will. It is true that here were political 
pressures on the Bank of Japan about Mieno's promotion to the governor. However, 
there were three reasons that the Bank of Japan kept interest rates low. First, the 
Bank of Japan was concerned about a sudden depreciation f the dollar. Second, the 
Bank of Japan did not perceive that the asset inflation would cause too serious 
problems in the future. Third, the Bank of Japan had no positive reasons to tighten 
monetary policy because there were no signs of an increase in inflationary 
pressures. 
  Another evidence for my argument can be derived from the fact hat he Bank of 
Japan increased its official discount rate from 2.5% to 3.25% in May 1989. In these 
days, it is laid that this hike in official rate was too late. However, this was not 
regarded as necessarily urgent measure in those days. Actually, widely-circulated 
newspapers declared in their editorials that increase in interest rates would not be 
necessary for the time being117). Although the yen kept weakening at a sluggish 
pace at that time, commodity prices did not rise so high that increase in interest 
rates was required1181. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance was opposed to it because 
the opposition parties objected to introduction fthe consumer tax in April 1989 by 
reason of follow-up rice hikes. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance was afraid 
that the U.S. might consider it to be abandonment of policy to expand omestic 
demand and request expanding overnment spending again. Besides, Japan-U.S. 
Structural Impediments Initiative was going to be held in September 1989. 
However, the Bank of Japan decided to raise its official discount rate as a 
precaution against inflation.
115) Asahi Shimbun, July 1, 1988, August 26, 1988. 
116) Asahi Shinibun, September 9, 1988. 
117) See, for example, Asahi Shimbun, February 26, 1989; Nihon Keizai Shinibun, March 26, 1989. 
118) Shukan Toyo Keizai, June 10, 1989.
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  If the Bank of Japan was forced not to raise its official discount rate by the 
government and the Ministry of Finance in 1988, the reason why the Bank of Japan 
raised the rate in May 1989 can not be explained because neither the government 
nor the Ministry of Finance endorsed increase in the rate at that time similarly. If 
the political pressures on the Bank of Japan about Mieno's promotion to the 
governor were the main reason of the Bank of Japan's indetermination in 1988, the 
Bank of Japan should not have run the risk in May 1989. Increase in the official 
discount rate at that time had the potential to draw condemnation of Mieno from the 
government and the Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, the Bank of Japan adhered 
to it and persuaded the Ministry of Finance to approve it. 
  There were three reasons that the Bank of Japan decided it. First, the U.S. trade 
deficit with Japan narrowed thanks to the economic expansion of Japan. Second, 
strong dollar policy of the Bush Administration depreciated the yen and cut the risk 
of collapse of the dollar. Third, and this is the most important, commodity prices 
rose to the slightest degree. That is, the official discount rate was not raised in 1988 
because there were no signs of an increase in inflationary pressures. However, in 
1989, there were faint signs of it. Therefore, the Bank of Japan determined increase 
in its official discount rate as a preventative measure. This corresponds to the 
conventional attitude of the Bank that gives top priority to the stability of 
commodity prices.
5. Conclusion
  In this article, I have demonstrated that the low level of the Bank of Japan's 
independence from the government and the Ministry of Finance did not cause the 
bubble economy. The Bank of Japan had no incentives to tighten monetary policy 
for the following reasons. First, the Bank could not perceive that the inflated asset 
prices were bubble (that is, they did not reflect the real demand) on the grounds that 
the asset prices had been inflated before it loosened monetary policy. Second, it did 
not have a clear-eyed awareness of the need to burst the asset bubble since it did not 
recognize that the asset price bubble would harm the economy in the future. Third, 
increase in interest rates was at high risk of giving rise to collapse of the dollar. 
Fourth, commodity prices were very stable. In sum, the Bank of Japan had no 
positive reasons to increase its official discount rate in order to burst the asset price 
bubble. 
  There might be some objections against this argument. I will conclude this 
article by answering these expected objections.
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  First, it might be seen as a problem that the Bank of Japan was dependent on the 
government about personnel management. Satoshi Sumita, who had served as 
Administrative Vice-Minister of Finance, served as Governor of the Bank of Japan. 
His background seemed to prevent him from being fully aware of the significance 
of the independence of the Bank of Japan from the government. Therefore, he 
might decide to lower interest rates without careful consideration. 
  Also, the govemment had the power to appoint the governor of the Bank of 
Japan, so that this could bring pressures upon the Bank by implying the 
government's opposition to Mieno's promotion to the govemor of the Bank. 
  Conventionally, a former Administrative Vice-Minister of Finance and a former 
executive of the Bank of Japan were appointed as the govemor of the Bank of Japan 
by turns. This tradition was criticized because it enabled the Ministry to govern the 
Bank. 
  However, it was a favorable rule to the Bank. In 1964, there was a conflict over 
the governor post between the Ministry and the Bank. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato 
took the occasion to appoint a private bank president as the governor119). The 
tradition that the Bank and the Ministry got the position by tums seems to be based 
on reflection on this. The Bank became able to get the position certainly once in 
twice. 
  It is not a problem that the govemor of the central bank is appointed by the 
government because it is a common practice in democratic countries. What is 
important is whether the governor of central bank is able to manage monetary 
policy of his/her own will. 
  Second, it might be viewed as a defect in a decision-making system of the Bank 
of Japan that the governor could make an arbitrary decision on changing the official 
discount rate. At the Policy Board, the governor as well as other four voting 
members appointed by the cabinet had only one vote. Hence, this enabled four 
voting members to override the governor's suggestions if he/she made the proposals 
in behalf of the government. For example, the Bundesbank decided to raise interest 
rates in April 1989 though the President opposed it120). However, the Policy Board 
of the Bank of Japan lapsed into the practice of following the recommendations
119) Ushio Shiota, Okura Jinmu Jikan no Tatakai [The Struggle of the Administrative Vice-Minister 
   of Finance] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1995), p.150. 
120) Henning, Currencies and Politics in tue United States, Germm?v, and Japan, pp.89-90; David 
    Marsh, Doitsu Rengin no Nazo (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1993), pp.82-88 [English version, 
    David Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank That Rules Europe (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 
   1992)].
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made by the executive board of directors within the Bank121). Accordingly, the 
Policy Board was called "Sleeping Board." Therefore, it might seem better than 
"Sleeping Board" that the Policy Board was the main policy-making body of the 
Bank. 
  However, it was also possible that voting members who went along with the 
government decided to loosen monetary policy despite the governor's opposition 
like the "palace coup" of the FRB in February 1986. Especially in Japan, because 
there was little opportunity for alternating government among différent parties, 
board members who were appointed by the government would have been likely to 
decide the policies in line with the government's expectations if the Policy Board 
had had the real power. 
  In the case of the Bundesbank, it was important hat the Central Bank Council 
members did not have the only one partisanship rince the majority of them were the 
presidents of the Land Central Banks of 11 provinces who were appointed by Land 
. governments, not by the central govemment122) 
  Thus, it enhanced rather than undermined the independence of the Bank of 
Japan that the executive board of directors which was composed of the officiais of 
the Bank but one Finance Ministry official who was transferred temporarily had the 
real power. 
  Finally, there may be objections that I overemphasize the independence of the 
Bank of Japan. Even if the executives of the Bank of Japan did not reach an 
agreement on increase in the official discount rate in 1988, the Bank of Japan could 
have increased it sooner if the Bank had been independent of the government and 
the Ministry of Finance completely. 
  It is true that the Bank of Japan was not independent completely, but there are 
no central banks that are independent of the govemment completely. As for 
example, I show the case of the Bundesbank. 
  John B. Goodman, who studied the politics of central banking in Western 
Europe, states that
  the Bundesbank has been cognizant of the fact that its independence 
ultimately rests on societal support, and it has long taken that support into 
account in fashioning monetary policy. For this precise reason, the 
Bundesbank has sometimes given ground-that is, it bas acceded to pressures
121) Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito, Financial Policy and Central Banking in Japan, p.89. 
122) Marsh, Doitsu Rengin no Nazo, pp.77-78.
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for greater monetary expansion. In general, the Bank has donc so only when 
two conditions have been met: first, when monetary expansion enjoyed 
overwhelming support within West Germany and abroad, and second, when 
the pursuit of such a policy did not threaten to ignite domestic inflation'23).
He takes two cases for instance.
  One episode, for example, occurred in 1967-68, just after the formation of 
the grand coalition, when in response to heavy political pressure the 
Bundesbank agreed to facilitate the placement of government debt and thereby 
help finance an ambitious deficit spending program. More recently, in 1978, 
the Bundesbank acquiesced in government demands that it set monetary 
policy in line with a major stimulus package, which Germany had accepted as 
part of the Bonn summit agreement. Both of these examples involved conflicts 
over economic policy during periods of economic stagnation when broad 
sections of German society favored a more expansionary policy. Although the 
central bank disagreed with the direction of fiscal policy on both occasions, il
realized that its independence might not weather a protracted struggle against 
popular government policies. By giving ground, the Bundesbank protected its 
independence and its ability to resist pressures for expansion over the long 
run 124).
  Additionally, I can take another case that in December 1987, the Bundesbank 
lowered the official discount rate, accepting the request for this from the 
government' 25). 
  Even the Bundesbank whose high level of independence was set by law had to 
accede to pressures for greater monetary expansion in sonie cases. In democratic 
countries, it is impossible for central banks to neglect the governments' wishes 
completely. Central banks must take them into accotait up to a point. Thus, central 
banks try to manage monetary policies which reflect their desires as much as 
possible, operating money market in a strategic way and appealing to public 
opinion and mass media. In comparison with central banks in other nations, the
123) John B. Goodman, Monetary SovereigntJ • The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe 
    (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p.59. 
124) John B. Goodman, "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Comparative Politics 23, no.3 
   (1991): 329-49. 
125) Marsh, Doitsu Rengin no Nazo, p.235.
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Bank of Japan managed monetary policy autonomously to significant extent though 
the law admitted less independence. 
  I have demonstrated in this article that the Bank of Japan was independent from 
the government and the Ministry of Finance to an extent that was important and that 
the Bank ultimately decided to loosen monetary policy on its own volition.
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